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Abstract
This paper examines the main ethical argument used to support the use of sex selection for non-medical reasons, namely 
that sex selection for non-medical reasons should be allowed on the grounds of reproductive autonomy. A critique of this 
argument is offered, concluding that sex selection for non-medical reasons should not be permitted.
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This paper examines the main ethical argument used to support 
the use of sex selection for non-medical reasons [author’s note: 
in the rest of the paper ‘sex selection for non-medical reasons’ 
will be referred to as ‘sex selection’ for brevity], namely that 
sex selection should be allowed on the grounds of reproductive 
autonomy. A critique of this argument is offered, concluding 
that sex selection should not be permitted. For the purposes of 
this discussion, it leaves aside any consideration of: the merits 
(or otherwise) of sex selection for medical reasons; the merits 
(or otherwise) of any procedure that results in the destruction 
of embryos; or the various means for achieving sex selection 
(Baldwin, 2006).
The argument from reproductive 
autonomy
The social reasons for sex selection can be diverse. Parents may 
wish to select the sex of a child in order to: (i) have a family that 
includes children of both sexes (so-called ‘family balancing’); 
(ii) have a child of the same sex as a deceased child in the 
family; or (iii) secure a cultural, economic, personal or social 
preference for a boy rather than a girl, or (rarely) vice versa 
(House of Commons Science and Technology Committee, 
2005 p 133).
Advocates of reproductive autonomy (e.g. Savulescu, 1999; 
Rhodes, 2001; Dahl, 2007) endorse the pre-eminence of 
parental choice in most circumstances in which sex selection 
might be contemplated. The central claim of this argument 
is that personal reproductive decisions should be free from 
interference unless they will cause serious harm to others. 
There should be a presumption towards liberty, in Mill’s sense 
(Feinberg, 1973). In other words, the burden of proof should 
reside with those wishing to restrict choices. Dahl sums up this 
argument when he says:
“each citizen ought to have the right to live his life as he [sic] 
chooses so long as he [sic] does not infringe upon the rights of 
others. The state may interfere with the free choices of its citizens 
only to prevent serious harm to others (Dahl, 2007 p. 158).”
It is therefore argued that, as family planning is increasingly 
subject to conscious decision-making, parents’ desire to choose 
their child’s sex should not be considered inherently different 
from other reproductive choices (such as choosing whether to 
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have a child, when to have a child, how many to have – or 
terminating an unwanted pregnancy). It is claimed that there 
is no evidence that sex selection, at least in the industrialized 
northern hemisphere, causes serious harm and, therefore, there 
is no justification for restricting individuals’ reproductive 
autonomy by prohibiting sex selection.
This argument is sometimes reinforced by claims that 
reproductive choices are ‘integral to a person’s sense of being’ 
(Jackson, 2007) and any restrictions therefore require even more 
robust justification than less important choices (Robertson, 
1994). For example, it might be thought that the level of 
evidence of harm needed to justify restricting reproductive 
choices should be higher than the level needed to justify less 
important choices. Or it might be argued that, as reproductive 
choice is very important, allowing people to exercise it is a good 
in itself and this good outweighs the production of a certain 
level of harm. In sum, there is a belief that the more important 
the particular choice, the stronger the case for restricting it has 
to be.
A critique of the argument from 
reproductive autonomy
A critique of the argument from reproductive autonomy is now 
presented in favour of sex selection.
Harm is caused by sex selection
John Harris, a leading proponent of reproductive autonomy and 
the unfettered application of reproductive technology, argues 
that sex selection does no harm:
“There is no complaint the ‘victim’ of gender selection can 
make because for her there was no alternative but never to have 
existed. ‘She’ could not have been a boy. … None of those 
children have any legitimate or even coherent complaint, for 
they could not have had an alternative life” (Harris, 2004 p. 4).
Savulescu also gives this argument in favour of sex selection:
“Most importantly, without sex selection, without a unique 
spermatozoon and egg uniting, that particular child would not 
have existed. Even if the child is disadvantaged psychologically, 
this is only wrong from the child’s perspective if its life is so 
bad that it is not worth living” (Savulescu, 1999 p. 374).
Thus, the arguments go, people cannot be harmed by having their 
existence prevented as there is no actual person to experience 
that harm (Parfit, 1984). Whether it is plausible to argue that 
those ‘victims’ thus created have no grounds for complaint, 
as Harris (2004) and Savulescu (1999) do, is a debate beyond 
the scope of this paper. However, accepting for sake of the 
argument that this claim is a sound one, we contend that there 
are other grounds on which it can be argued that sex selection 
creates harm. Most importantly, sex selection can create harm 
in the wider society in which it operates. For example, there is 
extensive evidence that the use of sex selection has resulted in 
significant disparities in child sex ratios in some South and East 
Asian countries, and in particular China and India. These have 
resulted from, and reinforce, patriarchal societal arrangements 
founded on pervasive discrimination against girls and women 
(Hughes et al., 1999; Croll, 2000, 2004; United Nations 
Population Fund, 2003; Banister, 2004; Ding and Hesketh, 
2006; Heng, 2006; Jha et al., 2006).
This point is acknowledged by advocates of sex selection. 
They acknowledge that, in certain cultures, the ‘abuse’ of the 
technology has resulted in harm for females. However, it can be 
countered that the harm of sex selection in misogynist cultures 
constitutes a lesser harm than those that would have arisen 
in its absence. For example, it has been argued that prenatal 
elimination of girls is more humane than ‘unwanted’ infant 
girls being neglected, abandoned or killed, (Hingorani and 
Sheroff, 1995). In similar vein, Dai (2001) has suggested that 
girls whose births are avoided will not be exposed to a life of 
discrimination and oppression (here, it should be noted that this 
argument comes perilously close to suggesting that the lives of 
girls in misogynist societies are not worth living at all). Women 
whose societal value and esteem depends on their ability to give 
birth to a son and who have access to technology will thereby 
be able to have control over the sex of their children and thus 
escape the stigma of failing to produce a son or avoid being 
condemned to repeated pregnancies until they do so (Moazam, 
2004).
In response to such arguments, we contend that the use of 
sex selection to avoid discrimination against children of the 
‘wrong’ sex colludes with the institutionalized discrimination 
that disadvantages women and girls (Croll, 2000). Additionally, 
it assumes both the infallibility of sex-selection technology and 
that the children will grow up in accordance with stereotypical 
gender norms. What fate might await a child where sex selection 
fails? Or one who develops a ‘wrong gender’ identity after their 
parents have gone to the effort and expense of sex selection? 
(Seavilleklein and Sherwin, 2007)
Although the risks of sex selection at a societal level are 
acknowledged by proponents of sex selection, they argue that 
these risks should not result in its prohibition in countries that 
can be ‘trusted’ to use it ‘responsibly’. Where the primary 
negative consequence of sex selection is perceived to be 
significant demographic imbalance, such as is evident in China 
and India, the low risk of this occurring in northern-hemisphere 
industrialized countries because of predicted low take-up of 
sex-selection services (Waldby, 2002; Richards, 2004) and 
their very different culture (Dahl, 2007), are cited to support a 
more liberal approach. Hence, proponents of sex selection do 
not argue that demographic imbalance is acceptable, rather they 
argue that sex selection in the UK and USA would not lead to 
this (House of Commons Science and Technology Committee, 
2005; Dahl, 2007). Indeed, Savulescu claims, ‘If you were 
concerned about the sex ratio, you would simply allow sex 
selection only for family balancing and there would be no effect 
on the sex ratio’ (Savulescu, 2004 p. 103).
Such arguments warrant closer examination. In particular, they 
are premised on contentious assumptions about the existence 
of a heterogeneous cultural mass in industrialized northern 
hemisphere countries. First, there is evidence of ‘son preference’ 
in European countries and the USA, although to a lesser extent 
than in some South and East Asian countries (Hank and Kohler, 
2000; Dahl et al., 2003a,b, 2006; van Balen, 2006). Second, 
there are many diaspora communities living in industrialized 42
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northern-hemisphere countries, some from cultures in which sex 
selection has been found to result in demographic imbalance. 
If sex selection were to be permitted in host countries, the 
possibility arises of such imbalance occurring in those countries, 
even if localized in specific communities (Culley, 2004).
Further, it can be argued that the notion of what constitutes 
a harm is too geographically localized in the accounts given 
by advocates of sex-selection. A permissive approach to sex 
selection in the industrialized northern-hemisphere countries 
could have detrimental effects beyond their own borders. One 
coalition of organizations concerned primarily with child welfare 
have made such a case: ‘Permitting sex selection on social 
grounds – including for ‘family balancing’ – promotes the view 
that the use of such techniques is acceptable. In recognition of 
its global rather than purely domestic responsibilities, the UK 
should make an explicit statement that it is not.’ (Project Group 
on Assisted Reproduction, 2006). Shenfield argues along similar 
lines: ‘the very value of human rights resides in their universal/
international application’ (Shenfield, 2005 p. 156). By allowing 
sex selection, the UK (and other countries that may be inclined 
to entrust their citizens to use sex selection ‘responsibly’) could 
be seen to be legitimizing the practice in other countries where 
the resulting harm is more visible and widespread. In doing so, 
it would undermine human rights commitments to respect all 
people equally.
Finally, although autonomy tends to have pre-eminence among 
the four key bioethics principles (autonomy, beneficence, non-
maleficence and justice) in contemporary Western bioethical 
discourse, we are not convinced that its primacy is established 
in the case of reproductive decision-making. Unlike other 
actions that could have little effect on others (if that is possible, 
but we will accept this for sake of the argument), reproductive 
choice ‘always affects others, and in particular affects any child 
who is brought into existence. So a mere appeal to autonomy 
or choice cannot be decisive in considering which reproductive 
technologies ought to be allowed and which prohibited’ (O’Neill, 
2006 p. 647). For instance, attention to the welfare of the child 
is thought to be a better principle on which to base decisions 
on who should have infertility treatment in the UK (House of 
Lords and House of Commons Joint Committee on the Human 
Tissue and Embryos (Draft) Bill, 2007) than would-be parent’s 
reproductive autonomy. Invoking principles of beneficence and 
non-maleficence to consider both the effects of sex selection 
on specific children and wider society seem to have at least the 
same purchase as the principle of reproductive autonomy when 
making such decisions.
Sex selection and the desire to have a 
child of a specific sex
We now want to consider the second premise of the argument 
from reproductive autonomy: that reproductive choices are 
important matters for individuals and therefore any restriction 
requires highly robust justification.
There is an understated current running through the debates over 
sex selection that a fierce preference for a child of a particular 
sex is immoral if that preference drives one to, say, abort or kill 
a newborn of the ‘wrong’ sex. Steinbock alludes to this when 
she says: ‘Even if it is okay to care about the sex of one’s child, 
should one care that much?’ (Steinbock, 2002 p. 25). However, 
much of the debate around sex selection also contains an implicit 
fatality along the lines that, where people have unworthy desires 
of wanting children of a particular sex, the consequences of not 
achieving that desire are invariably worse than having them met. 
For instance, a witness to the House of Commons Science and 
Technology Committee inquiry on Human Reproduction and 
the Law illustrated his support for sex selection through the use 
of an anecdote of a man whose failing marriage, it was argued, 
could be traced back to his parents’ wish for him to be a girl. ‘If 
sex selection had been available to the man’s parents then the 
daughter they would have produced by sex selection would not 
have had to face the same intolerable feeling of rejection that he 
did’ (House of Commons Science and Technology Committee, 
2005 p. 63).
Such arguments can be countered. To reject a child, for any 
reason, is not something that is supported by proponents of 
sex selection any more than by its opponents. The difference 
lies in the proposals for how to minimize the risks and/or what 
a moral standpoint looks like. While being clear that it is the 
rejection that is problematic, it is our view that it is morally 
unacceptable to allow sex selection simply because alternative 
ways of dealing with individual desires cannot be envisaged 
at a personal or societal level. The moral unacceptability of a 
‘strong’ preference for a child of a particular sex and of meeting 
such a preference could be supported on virtue ethics grounds, 
that this sort of choice is not the choice of a ‘good’ parent (see 
Scully et al., 2006) or a ‘good’ society. A morally acceptable 
position is that children should be wanted and valued for their 
intrinsic worth as human beings and this value should not be 
conditional on their possession of specific characteristics.
To take this further, Carson Strong, for example, argues that sex 
selection could lead to children becoming ‘more like products’ 
(Strong, 2001 p. 13). The ability of parents to choose what sort 
of children they are going to have could lead to them being 
less willing to tolerate their children’s shortcomings, and the 
child’s self-esteem could be adversely affected, undermining 
the unconditional acceptance of a child (Scully et al., 2006). 
A very strong preference for a child of a certain sex that could 
lead to the killing or rejection of a child of the ‘wrong sex’ can 
be argued to be an immoral state of affairs and not something 
that society should provide people with the means to fulfil.
However, it might be argued by proponents of sex selection that, 
in the industrialized northern hemisphere, the type of preference 
for a child of a particular sex is not a ‘strong’ preference. Rather 
than leading to infanticide or neglect; it may instead be a ‘weak’ 
preference for ‘family balancing’, a preference that is morally 
acceptable or at least not morally objectionable (Ten, 1998; 
Rhodes, 2001; Baldwin, 2006). There are two responses to this. 
First, allowing some people to exercise this ‘weak’ preference 
would also allow those who had a strong preference to use 
sex-selection techniques and we have argued that this strong 
preference should be resisted. Second, there is the possibility 
of harms resulting from sex selection and these harms should 
not be risked merely to satisfy the ‘weak’ desire of some 
people to ‘balance’ their families. As Onora O’Neill (2006) 
says, ‘the thought that sex selection is acceptable for family 
balancing, ‘invites scrutiny. What makes a family ‘balanced’ or 
‘unbalanced’? Are families consisting only of daughters or of 
sons less desirable than families that include both?’p. 647. 43
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In summary, if people have a strong desire to have a child of 
a particular sex they should not be allowed to because: (i) in 
countries where this desire is relatively widespread it leads 
to well-recognized harms; (ii) this preference is not a morally 
acceptable one and should not be encouraged by legislation 
providing people with the means to do it (Bahadur, 2005). If 
people have a weak preference, e.g. for ‘family balancing’, 
then this is not worth defending (with the concomitant risks of 
harms and abuses) merely to satisfy such a type of preference. 
Thus, the second premise of the argument from reproductive 
autonomy, that reproductive choices are important, is not met 
with the type of sex selection that is typically advocated for use 
in the northern industrialized hemisphere (Pennings, 1996).
Sexism
Finally, it has to be acknowledged that the use of sex selection 
takes place in societies where, contrary to media representations, 
sexism still exists. In countries where the position of women is 
more clearly subjugated to men, the existence of sexism might 
not be a cause for debate and the effects of sex selection are 
clear. In the northern industrialized hemisphere, however, it 
is often argued that concerns over sexism have receded. Dahl 
(2007) argues that the charge that sex selection is sexist is 
unwarranted in this part of the world as most families simply 
want to ‘balance’ their families. However, even here there is 
still a preference for first-born sons (Robertson, 2001) and it 
can be argued that this preference arises out of a sexist society 
(Seavilleklein and Sherwin, 2007). It has to be remembered 
that choices do not take place in a social vacuum, that what 
people do both affects and is affected by the social context. As 
an antidote to any temptation towards complacency, the latest 
report of the Equal Opportunities Commission (2007) found 
that sex discrimination in the UK is still rife and sex equality 
will take generations to achieve. Therefore, in societies where 
sexism exists (including the UK), sex selection, if permitted, 
will not take place on an even playing field. Sex selection has 
the potential to reinforce sex stereotypes and perpetuate sex 
discrimination. As Marilyn Strathern said, ‘it is worth asking 
whether making [sex selection] acceptable to select one sex in 
preference to another at the moment of conception will make 
it easier or harder to promote anti-discriminatory measures in 
other areas of life’ (quoted in Shenfield, 2005 p. 156).
Conclusion
It has been argued that the case for sex selection for non-medical 
reasons based on the argument for reproductive autonomy is 
flawed. Fundamentally, such autonomy arguments do not take 
into consideration the social embeddedness of choices that 
people make. No one is an island and no choice is made in 
a vacuum. It is concluded that sex selection on non-medical 
grounds should not be allowed.
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